We consider a generalization of the house-selling problem to selling k houses. Let the offers, X 1 , X 2 , . . ., be independent, identically distributed k-dimensional random vectors having a known distribution with finite second moments. The decision maker is to choose simultaneously k stopping rules, N 1 , . . . , N k , one for each component. The payoff is the sum over j of the jth component of X N j minus a constant cost per observation until all stopping rules have stopped. Simple descriptions of the optimal rules are found. Extension is made to problems with recall of past offers and to problems with a discount.
§1. Introduction and Summary. You own k objects. Each day you receive a vector of offers, say X n = (X (1) n , . . . , X (k) n ) on day n, where X (j) n represents that day's offer for the jth object. It is assumed that X 1 , X 2 , . . . are independent and identically distributed having a known k-variate distribution with finite second moments. There is a cost of c > 0 per vector of observations. At each stage you may sell none, any one, any two, . . . , or all of the objects. You are to continue until all objects are sold. Your payoff is the sum of the selling prices of the objects minus c times the number of vectors observed.
This problem was suggested to us by James B. MacQueen who modeled it as a buying problem. You want to buy Christmas presents for your two children. After deciding which two presents to buy, you go to various stores. With two presents to buy, you can be a little more choosy. If the price of one of the gifts is clearly too high, you know you will have to go to another store anyway, so you will reject a borderline price for the other gift.
This problem is a multidimensional generalization of the celebrated house-selling problem, introduced by MacQueen and Miller (1960) , Derman and Sacks (1960) , Chow and Robbins (1961) , and Sakaguchi (1961) . In the economics literature, this problem is known as the job search problem and traced back to Stigler (1961 Stigler ( , 1962 . See McNamara (1990, 1993) for recent work and McMillan and Rothschild (1994) for a review of this aspect of the problem.
Various multiple house-selling problems have already appeared in the literature. The original paper of MacQueen and Miller (1960) contains an extension to the problem of selling k identical objects when single offers come in daily, and recall of past offers is allowed. The paper of Karlin (1962) , contains a discussion of the problem of selling two identical objects with finite horizon and no cost, with one offer per time period and no recall of past offers. This has been generalized by Derman, Lieberman and Ross (1972) , Albright (1974) and others (see Righter (1990) ) to selling non-identical objects with one offer per time period. It has also been generalized by Saario (1986) , Stadje (1985 Stadje ( , 1990 and Saario and Sakaguchi (1990) to selling k identical objects with cost, finite horizon and random arrival of offers. The only treatment of house-selling problems with vector offers, seems to be by Sakaguchi (1973 and 1978) , but this appears in a game-theoretic setting in which two players must agree to stop and accept the present bivariate offer, and the problem is to find equilibrium points.
In the case of vectors of independent identically distributed offers, one could set up a classical multiple house-selling model with batch arrivals to treat this problem. However, one would need the rather unnatural assumption that the batch sizes be exactly equal to the number of objects remaining to be sold. The closest to this approach in the literature seems to be the paper of Nakai (1986) . But in his paper, there is a finite horizon rather than a cost, and the sizes of the batches are random with binomial distributions.
In Section 2, we treat completely the problem of selling two objects and indicate the effect of dependence of the offers on the optimal return. In Section 3, we treat the general problem and note an interesting convexity property of the value function. In Section 4, we solve the problem when recall of past offers is allowed. In the one object case, there is no difference between the optimal rules for selling with or without recall, as observed by Chow and Robbins (1961) . For selling several objects, the rules become quite distinct, and the methods of treatment are different as well. In Section 5, some models in which the cost is replaced by a discount are investigated. §2. Selling two objects. We specialize the description of the problem in the introduction to k = 2 objects and denote the sequence of vector offers by (X 1 , Y 1 ), (X 2 , Y 2 ), . . ., assumed to be i.i.d. with finite second moments.
Once one object is sold, the problem reduces to the standard house-selling problem.
From the general theory, see for example Chow, Robbins and Siegmund (1971) , it is known, under the condition that the second moments be finite, that an optimal rule exists and is given by the principle of optimality. Furthermore, the optimality equation holds. Let V x and V y denote the optimal values of the problems of selling the x-object and y-object separately. These values are the unique solutions of the optimality equations, 
Proof. We frame the problem as a stopping rule problem where stopping is identified with selling at least one object. If we stop at stage n having observed (X n , Y n ), we may choose to sell both objects and receive X n + Y n , sell the x-object alone and receive X n + V y , or sell the y-object alone and receive Y n + V x . Thus, if we stop at stage n, we receive W n − nc, The optimal rule given by the principle of optimality is to continue sampling until W n ≥ V xy , and then to stop and sell both objects if X n + Y n = W n , the x-object alone if In fact this argument shows something stronger, that V + c is superadditive, namely,
Theorem 2. An optimal rule for the 2-object problem at stage n is as follows. Sell the Proof. From Lemma 1, the expectation in (2) reduces to the sum of the integrals over the four regions,
The rule given by the principle of optimality is to sell both objects in region A4, in region A1 sell the x-object only, in region A2 sell the y-object only, and sell neither object in region A3 (see Figure 1) . Thus, we always sell the x-object if X ≥ V xy − V x . And if this is the case, we sell the y-object as well if Y ≥ V y , which is the optimal strategy for selling Figure 1 . The optimal regions.
In this way, we may reduce the description of the optimal strategy to that given in the theorem. §2.1 Example. Suppose that X and Y are independent and identically distributed according to the uniform distribution on the interval (0,1). Then as found in DeGroot (1970) for example, equations (1) reduce to
, the respective parts of the integrals in Equation (2) over the four regions become,
Adding these, we find that equation (2) becomes
5528 and V xy = 1.2730. The optimal rule is to accept any one offer greater than V xy − V 1 = .7202. Otherwise, accept both offers if the sum is greater than V xy = 1.2730. Once one object has been sold, accept any offer for the other greater than
For 1/2 ≤ c ≤ 1, the integral in (2) An interesting phenomenon occurs in this case. Namely, that if we were selling each object separately, we would accept the first offer that comes in. Here, in selling two objects, we would refuse both offers if the sum of the offers is less than V xy .
Finally, if c ≥ 1, we accept the first offers that come in and the value is V xy = 1 − c. §2.2 Dependence. It is of interest to see what effect dependence of the variates has on the optimal rules and the expected return. We look at two cases, with X and Y ∈ U(0, 1) having perfect positive dependence and perfect negative dependence. The conclusion is that positive dependence tends to improve the optimal return and negative dependence to worsen it; however, we have no general results along these lines.
Case 1: Perfect positive dependence, Y = X. Clearly, we accept both or neither.
Thus, the problem is as if there was one object to sell, the cost is divided by 2 and the optimal return is multiplied by 2. For c ≤ 1, the value is V xy = 2(1 − √ c) (for k objects with perfect positive dependence it would be k(1 − 2c/k)), and the optimal rule is to sell both objects if their common value is at least 1 − √ c. For c = .1, we have V xy = 1.3675.
Case 2: Perfect negative dependence, Y = 1−X. The optimality equation (2) becomes,
and the first option of selling both objects is never taken. This becomes the multiple house selling problem of Saario and Sakaguchi (1990) in which the objects are always sold separately and we
, if one object has an offer of at least 1 − V 1 , we sell just that object; otherwise we sell both objects. If c > 1/2 (V 1 < 0), we always sell both objects. §3. Selling Many Objects. Suppose that there are k objects to be sold and let the vectors of offers be denoted by X 1 , X 2 , . . .. It is assumed that these random vectors are i.i.d. copies of a random vector X = (X 1 , . . . , X k ) with finite second moments. Let K = {1, 2, . . . , k} denote the set of objects to be sold. For a subset S ⊂ K, we let V (S) denote the expected return using an optimal policy for selling the objects in S. If S consists of a single point, then V (S) is found as in Equation (1). If S consists of two points, then V (S) may be found from Equation ( 
The proof is an extension of the proof of Theorem 1. §3.1 Description of the Optimal Rule. From (5), we can obtain the form of the optimal strategy. If X n is written as (X 1,n , . . . , X k,n ) and if at stage n, K represents the set of unsold objects, then the optimal rule given by the principle of optimality is to sell the objects in some subset S 0 for which i∈S
If this maximum occurs for S 0 = K, then all objects are sold and we stop. After the objects in S 0 , if any, are sold, we continue to the next stage using an optimal policy for selling the objects in S c 0 . This continues until all objects are sold.
We may simplify this description of the optimal policy but we require the following generalization of Lemma 1. We are indebted to Fred Delbaen for the proof. The conclusion is that the value function, V (S), satisfies (7) below. In game theory, such value functions are called convex and play a role in the theory of the core. See Shapley (1971) .
This lemma is stated in somewhat greater generality than is needed for this paper. In particular, it is not necessary to assume that the vectors X 1 , X 2 , . . . are independent or identically distributed. This will be important in the extension of these results to adaptive problems in which the distribution of the X's is only partially known.
A stopping vector for this problem is a vector, τ = (τ 1 , . . . , τ k ), of stopping rules τ i , each adapted to the same sequence of σ-fields,
, where F n contains the σ-field generated by X 1 , . . . , X n . (This definition requires, for example, that once an object is sold, we may still observe the future offers for it.) Let T denote the set of all stopping vectors. Then for a set A ⊆ K, the value is defined as
The only assumptions on the X i that we use is that the expectation in (6) exists for all τ ∈ T and A ⊆ K and that V (S) < ∞ for all S in K. 
Lemma 2. For arbitrary
To see this, let a * and b * denote the maximum of the a j 's and b j 's respectively, and suppose
follows from symmetry. Now let σ = σ(A) and τ = τ (B) be -optimal stopping vectors for A and B respectively. Now the value of σ does not depend on the components σ j for j ∈ A. We extend the definition by putting X j,0 = 0 for all j ∈ K and changing σ j = 0 (resp. τ j = 0) for all j ∈ A (resp. j ∈ B). Then V (A) + V (B) may be written Since they are suboptimal on A ∪ B and A ∩ B respectively, we immediately obtain
for all > 0. This gives inequality (7).
We remark that this proof shows the slightly stronger result that inequality (7) holds even if V (∅) were defined to be −c. Proof. Let m and S m be as described in the theorem and let T ⊆ K. We will show that selling the objects in T ∪S m is at least as profitable as selling the objects in T . Then in any case it is optimal to sell the objects in S m . If S m ⊆ T , we are done. So assume S m ⊂ T .
Then |T ∩ S m | < m, so from the definition of m, we have i∈T
We may also use Lemma 2 to simplify the description of the sets, A(S), of points in the sample space for which it is optimal to sell the objects in S and none of the objects in S c . From the principle of optimality,
The number of inequalities in this representation of the set A(S) is 2 k − 1.
In the following theorem, a representation of A(S) is given that uses only (2 m − 1) + (2 k−m − 1) inequalities, where m = |S|. We show that A(S) is exactly the set of points in the sample space for which the sale of any subset of objects of S contributes at least as much its or their expected contribution (increment) of gain under an optimal policy later on, and for which, at the same time, all other subsets completely in the complement of S are worth keeping unsold, since their expected contribution to the future expected gain under an optimal sales policy is larger than their present contribution.
Theorem 5.
(11)
Proof. First suppose X satisfies the inequalities of (11). Consider an arbitrary T ⊆ K, T = S and cancel X i for i ∈ S ∩ T from both sides of equation (10). We are to show
Since T − S ⊂ S c and S − T ⊂ S, we have from (11)
i∈T −S
as was to be shown.
Now suppose X satisfies the inequalities of (10). Then for T ⊆ S,
and for T ⊆ S c , i∈T
Selling k identical objects. In the case of k identical objects with i.i.d.
offers, the description of the optimal rule is easy. Let the offers be denoted by X 1 , . . . , X k .
(Independence of X 1 , . . . , X k is not required for this result; exchangeability suffices.) Let V j represent the value of the problem with j identical objects (e.g.
and let V 0 = 0). The optimality equations become, inductively in k,
where S j is the set of all subsets of size j in {1, 2, . . . , k}. The optimal rule is as follows.
Order the offers in decreasing order,
Otherwise accept no offers. Once any objects are sold, revert to the optimal strategy for selling the remaining objects (before looking at the next vector of offers).
The argument is straightforward and does not even use convexity. With the X i arranged in decreasing order, the inside maximum in (12) occurs at
for some j. If it is optimal to accept anything, it is optimal to accept at least X 1 .
, it is optimal to select both X 1 and X 2 at least. And so forth. §3.3 Example. As an illustration, consider the case k = 3 with independent uniform (0,1) random variables. We solve the optimality equations (12) For 0 < c ≤ 1/2, the expectation in (12) is
Setting this to V 3 + c and solving for V 3 gives the optimal return. When c = .1, we have
5528, V 2 = 1.2730, and we find V 3 = 2.0354. See Table 1 .
For .5 ≤ c ≤ 1, we have V 1 < 0, so that (12) reduces to 946 .825 .713 .606 .503 .401 .300 .200 .100 §4. Selling the objects with recall. Suppose we are able to accept any of the past offers. The setup is as follows. We observe X 1 , X 2 , . . . sequentially, assumed to be i.i.d. k-dimensional random vectors with finite second moments. We may observe as long as we please at a cost of c > 0 per observed vector, and when we stop we may select the largest offer for each object from among all past offers. Thus our payoff if we stop at stage 
Proof. We show that N 1 is the optimal rule by showing it is the one-stage look-ahead rule and showing the problem is monotone. If we are at stage n and stop, we would receive
n − nc. If we continue one stage and stop, we expect to receive
where F n represents the sigma-field generated by the first n vectors. The one-stage lookahead rule calls for stopping as soon as the former is greater than the latter. Namely, we stop at the first n such that
Thus, the one-stage look-ahead rule stops at the first n for which
Since we have assumed finite second moments, the one-stage look-ahead rule is optimal provided the problem is monotone. To show the problem is monotone, we must show that if the one-stage look-ahead rule calls for stopping at stage n then it will call for stopping with probability one at all future stages. Since the φ j (x) are non-increasing in x, we see that the problem is monotone since M
n are almost surely nondecreasing.
It is of interest to note that the optimal rule depends on the joint distribution of the offers only through the marginal distributions.
As an example, suppose the X (j) have marginal uniform distributions on the interval (0,1). The functions φ j become φ j (x) = (1 − x) 2 /2, and the optimal rule is to stop at the first n for which
Thus, we stop when the Euclidean distance from (M The simplest extension is to allow discounting on each object until it is sold. This leads to an optimality equation of the form,
where V y and V x are the optimal returns for selling the y and x objects optimally with discount β, and satisfy the equations determined by Karlin (1962) ,
For this formulation, it is optimal to sell the objects optimally separately, and V xy = V x + V y . The possible dependence of X and Y plays no role in this result.
To obtain a nontrivial result analogous to the cost case, two modifications of this model are presented. The more direct extension to an additive model to selling many objects does not seem to be as flexible as was possible for the cost model. Therefore a multiplicative model is also introduced. §5.1 Additive model. We assume that if one object is sold, the discount on its value continues until the other is sold. In other words, money from the first sale cannot be deposited in the bank until the second object is sold as well. Thus, if one object is sold at a value X = x (respectively Y = y), continuing optimally to sell the other object gives a return V y (x) (respectively V x (y)) satisfying
It is useful to rearrange terms and rewrite this in the form (14) (
corresponding to (1). The optimality equation for the problem of selling the objects together then becomes
corresponding to (2). In the modeling of this problem as a buying problem, we must travel from store to store until both objects are bought. Then we return home and the discounting stops.
It seems difficult to give general reductions on the form of the optimal rule for this problem. Instead, we solve it in the special case of independent uniform distributions on the interval (0,1). In this case, V x (z) = V y (z) for all z so we may drop the subscript. Since
and leads for V (z) ≥ z to the equation
with solution,
For β ≥ 2/3, we have β/(2(1 − β)) > 1 so the lower half of this expression is not in force.
From this, (15) reduces to
One may find V xy , by numerical integration coupled with some root finding procedure. To
give an indication of the size of the optimal expected payoff, this equation where X represents the value of the job and Y the ability of the worker, similar to a model treated by Derman, Lieberman and Ross (1972) , except that in our model both workers and jobs arrive. A model for matching pairs of arrivals may be found in the paper of David and Yechiali (1986) .
The optimality equation for discount β becomes
where V x (y) and V y (x) are the optimal return functions for the maximizing Xy and Y x respectively. These functions satisfy the equations
From this, we can see that V y (x) = xV y , where V y is the unique number satisfying V y = βE max{Y, V y } and similarly V x (y) = yV x , where V x is the unique number satisfying V x = βE max{X, V x }. The optimality equation reduces to
It is not difficult to show using the method of proof of Theorem 1 that there is a unique solution to this equation for V xy and that the principle of optimality leads to an optimal rule. When X and Y are independent, the description of this rule may be simplified using the following analog of Lemma 1. We do not know if the logarithmic convexity analogue of Lemma 2 holds for this model of selling more than two assets.
Logarithmic superadditivity implies that the optimal selling regions have a form similar to that of Figure 1 but with the line x + y = V xy replaced by the curve xy = V xy .
As an example, consider the case of X and Y independent uniform random variables on the interval (0, 1). Then, In the discounted case, the problem of selling the objects with recall has a solution quite similar to that of Section 4 for the cost case. In the notation of that section, the payoff for stopping at stage n is β
n . The one-stage look-ahead rule has a form similar to that of Theorem 6, namely,
where as before φ j (x) = E(X (j) − x) + . Since the φ j (x) are nonincreasing in x and the
M (j)
n are almost surely nondecreasing in n for each j, the problem is monotone and so N 1 is optimal (under the assumption of finite second moments). Again, we see the optimal rule depends on the joint distribution of offers only through the marginal distributions.
The details follow as in Section 4.
